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ABSTRACT: Since the era dominated by industrial production to the knowledge-based 
society, the traditional way of choosing leaders has been to change the development of 
non-traditional leadership skills. In addition to the traditional leadership virtues, taking 
into account the previously unconventional skills have become extremely important in 
selecting leaders in a modern army. 
Future challenges can only be tackled by adaptive organizations in which individuals 
have to make much more autonomous decisions, to adapt to the ever-changing envi-
ronment that management needs to take into account and support. 
The generals of the future have to form a strategy in a complex environment, they have 
to learn how to apply a comprehensive approach, when they have to cooperate with dif-
ferent types of professionals and participants in the possession of visionary, operative and 
bridge building skills – and this is not easy because different roles require different ways 
of thinking. 
In history, we find examples of such leaders, which in our time are becoming alive, be-
cause if organizations are not ready to find rapid answers to the challenges, if their deci-
sion-making processes are overwhelmed, no hopeful success is expected. Deeply embed-
ded, centralized command and control in the armed forces is not an appropriate response 
to extremely complex asymmetric situations, especially when facing critical challenges 
that require immediate decisions. 
Leadership is not the same as power. Non-traditional leaders need to have followers, 
associates who support their idea and achieve a degree of freedom. 
A good example of acquiring the necessary learning and adaptation skills in this world 
is the convincing example of the success of tuatara, a real living fossil, of evolutionary 
survival. 
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Thomas E . Ricks argued in his recent book1, that in American history the leadership quality 
started to deteriorate when the highest-ranking generals became reluctant to fire underper-
forming generals under their command . He pointed out that the fear made the generals per-
form better . We tend to disagree with this argument, as we believe that any quality degrada-
tion, if it exists, is more likely a result of a leadership gap . 
There are several reasons, why this leadership gap is present . First of all, we would like 
to point out that since the end of WWII (World War II) the political masters have been in-
creasingly influencing who gets removed, which has made the leader selection process and 
the mind-set of military leaders more conventional . Secondly, during this time the context 
1 Ricks, Th . E . The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. New York: Penguin Press, 
2012 .
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have changed as well and as we are progressing from an industrial era towards a knowl-
edge-based society, leadership is quite different and more complex. Today the use of fear 
and an arsenal of other tools of an autocratic leader to motivate seems to be inadequate and 
has quite the opposite effect from the one that we got used to twenty years ago. The modern 
toolkit of leaders must be much wider and they need to develop unconventional leadership 
skills as part of their arsenal to compliment the conventional skills . 
At Exercise Allied Reach2, the main theme was Future Security Challenges for the Al-
liance and the transformation efforts required from NATO countries to be able to counter 
such challenges . In our opinion the real goal is not to counter future challenges, but rather 
embrace the uncertainty of the complex environment and build adaptive organizations which 
proactively influence the future. With the amount of uncertainty all around, it is an almost 
impossible task to figure out what the future brings, and the key for success is the capability 
of organizations to quickly adapt to the ever-changing environment . One of the key aspects 
of adaptation is the unconventional leadership capability within the organization .
THE LEADERSHIP GAP
Thomas Ricks, in his book, formulates an answer3 and it is somewhat similar to the one 
described by General Krulak in his Three Block War concept . Ricks suggests that future 
generals need not only to understand strategy in a complex environment but they need to 
learn to fight the war amongst the people, show respect for the population with a cultural 
sensitivity, use a comprehensive approach (including all services, interagency, indigenous 
and multinational partners), as well as being able to speak a political language, not just a 
military one . We have heard about the Strategic Corporal before, but what we really need is 
more generals who are unconventional thinkers and leaders . Hence, this article attempts to 
answer what unconventional leadership is about .
Maccoby4 in his research also points out that in the fast pacing and complex world we 
need leaders who can mobilize people for the common good . He calls the new era knowl-
edge workers interactives, and argues that these people need a flatter, networked working 
environment and a leader who possesses three leadership qualities: transformational vision, 
operational obsessiveness and trust-creating bridge building . He also emphasizes that Per-
sonality and Strategic Intelligence are the new leadership qualities for the age of knowledge 
work . Personality Intelligence builds more on emotional intelligence5, Strategic Intelligence 
more on systems thinking and practical intelligence6 . 
Transformational visionaries are leaders, who communicate vision with a compelling 
sense of purpose . Operational obsessives are operational leaders, who have the systems 
thinking to build the organization and infuse the energy that transforms the visions into 
results . Finally, bridge builders are leaders, who can facilitate the understanding and trust 
2 Allied Reach is a yearly Strategic exercise for NATO . In 2013 it was organized in Norfolk, Virginia .
3 Ricks, Th . E . The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. New York: Penguin Press, 
2012 .
4 Maccoby, M . The Leaders We Need . Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2007 .
5 To read more on emotional intelligence read Goleman, D . Emotional intelligence: Why it can Matter More Than 
IQ . New York: Bantam Press, 2006 . and Bradberry, T . Emotional Intelligence 2.0 . New York: Talent Smart, 2009 .
6 For a description of the difference between analytic, practical and creative intelligence, see Sternberg, R. J. The 
Hierarchic Mind: A New theory of Human Intelligence . New York: Viking, 1988 . and Sternberg, R . J . Successful 
Intelligence: How Practical and Creative Intelligence Determine Success in Life. New York: Plume, 1997 .
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that turns different types of specialists into collaborators. This is a very important piece of 
leadership, since, we are facing more and more complex problems, and while solving these 
problems, adaptation and organizational change always create a lot of stress . People’s skills 
are also important during the adaptation process, since people resist a change if they per-
ceive this change as a loss. It is my belief, that the different leadership roles required from 
modern leaders require different mind-sets, therefore it is quite difficult to obtain all the 
necessary skills by one individual . 
It is clear that the officers who were promoted during the Cold War era were rewarded 
for showing talent in commanding large manoeuvre units on the conventional battlefield. 
This conventional mind-set was action oriented, concentrated on producing results with 
very little thought spent on considering the consequences or people’s feelings during the 
process. In asymmetric conflicts though, which were a dominant form of combat in the last 
fifty years, a broader range of knowledge was needed, and the military leaders had to rely 
on unconventional leadership skills as well as conventional ones to be able to successfully 
engage the enemy in these very complex conflicts. It is not a new phenomenon though, so 
in this article we use an ancient example of Attila the Hun as well as a modern case study 
of Special Forces to support our argument and shed some light on the unconventional side 
of leadership .
There are many ancient examples of unconventional leaders throughout the histo-
ry, and John Arquilla’s book7 is an excellent read to study many of them, but we have 
chosen the Attila, who is often called the Scourge of God for a specific reason. There 
are relatively few researches on his leadership style and he is mostly misunderstood and 
portrayed as a bloodthirsty barbarian, instead of a brilliant, unconventional leader . Special 
Forces also have long been on the forefront of fighting asymmetric conflicts and their 
importance seems to be steadily rising ever since 11 September . Many of their heroic 
accomplishments might never see the light8, and the full scale of the shadow war might 
never be revealed, but it is interesting to see the expansion of the role of Special Forces 
in contemporary conflicts. The establishment of a JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Tasks 
Force) in Iraq was an organizational example of unconventional leadership in itself, and 
Stanley McChrystal’s role as an unconventional leader is a perfect example how one per-
son is able to influence an organizational adaptation process and change ages old theories 
on asymmetric warfare9 .
We argue that conventional and unconventional leadership styles are quite different and 
it takes a lot of efforts to master both of them. It is not our purpose to argue which one is 
better, we just simply want to point out that unconventional leadership is an often neglected 
and relatively rarely used leadership option, which must be on the repertoire of every leader 
today .
7 Arquilla, J . Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World . Chi-
cago, Ivan R . Dee, 2011 .
8 Kelley, M . “US Special Ops Have Become Much, Much Scarier Since 9/11” . Business Insider, 10 May 2013 . 
http://www .businessinsider .com/the-rise-of-jsoc-in-dirty-wars-2013-4#ixzz2jtF8yaxV
9 My understanding here is that the ages old theory that “you are not supposed to kill your way into victory” in an 
asymmetric conflict has changed and through the increasing effectiveness of JSOTF activities in Iraq, the Task 
Force was able to eliminate so many key insurgent leaders that the insurgent conversion mechanism was unable 
to create enough replacements .
16 HUNGARIAN DEFENCE REVIEW, Special Issue 2019, Vol. 147, Nr. 1–2
THE SCOURGE OF GOD 
When we think of a King archetype, hardly anyone would mention Attila, the Hun, who 
is mostly remembered as the Scourge of God .  He is widely portrayed as a savage and a 
bloodthirsty barbarian, and being Hungarian ourselves, we thought that we should do some 
research, before we buy into this story. What we found out, was quite different from the 
misconception and was surprisingly revealing at the same time .
In his book Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun10, Roberts describes timeless lessons 
in win-directed, take-charge management that best describes Attila’s real character . From 
Roberts we learn that barbaric, husband of four hundred women, cruel, and carnivorous are 
qualities that typically do not describe the ideal leader: Attila the Hun . Taking over the world 
is the ultimate challenge for just about any leader, and Attila seems to have accomplished it 
with poise and grace . Nearly 1,500 years after his reign, some researchers are still studying 
his strategies, which are applicable to any organization, group, company, or country . This 
single man initiated and led the transformation of nomadic tribal barbarians into undisputed 
rulers of the ancient world .
Very few people know that if he was living today, he would be described as an entrepre-
neur, diplomat, social reformer, statesman, civilizer, brilliant field marshal and host of some 
outstanding parties . Researchers have found that he dared to accomplish seemingly impos-
sible tasks in his age . He began his rise to power by renewing and developing relationships 
with tribal chieftains . He lived a very simple life (even when he was ‘guest’ of the Roman 
court in his youth) and reformed the strategies of the 700,000-strong Hun army (a loose con-
glomeration of barbarians) so well that it is still an example of swarming tactics11 this day . 
It is important to point out that Roberts defines leadership as the privilege of having 
responsibility over others’ actions and the organization’s purpose, all of which can affect 
the organization’s success or failure . The organizational application of unconventional 
leadership represents a model or system, that also embraces the fact that no one can pre-
dict circumstances or situations, and consequently the influence they will have on others. 
10 There are several books on Attila, but by far the most insightful one seems to be Wess Robers’s book: Leadership 
Secrets of Attila the Hun . This is the book that reveals the leadership secrets of Attila the Hun - the man who 
shaped an aimless band of mercenary tribal nomads into the undisputed rulers of the ancient world centuries ago, 
and who offers us timeless lessons in win-directed, take-charge management today.
11 Swarming is a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military 
strikes from all directions. It employs a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire that is directed from both close-
in and stand-off positions. It will work best – perhaps it will only work – if it is designed mainly around the 
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked manoeuvre units . This calls for an organizational redesign – 
involving the creation of platoon-like pods joined in company-like clusters – that would keep but retool the most 
basic military unit structures. It is similar to the corporate redesign principle of flattening, which often removes 
or redesigns middle layers of management . This has proven successful in the ongoing revolution in business 
affairs and may prove equally useful in the military realm. From command and control offline units to logistics, 
profound shifts will have to occur to nurture this new way of war. This study examines the benefits – and also 
the costs and risks – of engaging in such serious doctrinal change . The emergence of a military doctrine based on 
swarming pods and clusters requires that defence policymakers develop new approaches to connectivity and con-
trol and achieve a new balance between the two . Far more than traditional approaches to battle, swarming clearly 
depends upon robust information flows. Securing these flows, therefore, can be seen as a necessary condition for 
successful swarming . This concept is best described in Arquilla, J . and Ronfeldt, D . Swarming and the Future of 
Conflict. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000 . http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/
RAND_DB311.pdf
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Thus, relating it to Attila initially appears difficult. His leadership qualities (many relate to 
emotional stability and stamina) show that a leader must be loyal, courageous, self-con-
fident, empathetic, and credible. In Robert’s book we can also read extensively how he 
takes care of his Huns and encourages their active participation and through this enables 
their success . 
Attila’s leadership style includes a pattern of constant strategies involving the impor-
tance of commitment, accountability, standards, and quality . The undoubtedly successful 
approach of Attila the Hun focuses on continuous improvement and full commitment of the 
organization, the Huns, but not at the expense of the people’s morale . Focusing on quality, 
Attila created consistently disciplined Huns, who ideally, and realistically, began to disci-
pline one another individually and subordinately . Morale within an army of 700,000 wild 
creatures is not easy to attain, but through consistent behaviours of his own such as account-
ability, loyalty, and confidence, Attila maintained this unified purpose. 
Holding every member of any sized organization accountable for their actions and en-
suring reliability and consistency in their behaviour is a must for a king who wants to rule 
his realm for extensive periods of time . Again, and again he stresses the importance of indi-
vidual quality performance and commitment . He understood that if at the basic, single level, 
you cannot rely on one person, then your army will not be successful, therefore he gave a 
lot of freedom to his chieftains, but held each of them accountable for their actions and the 
actions of their subordinates as well .  
If he was able to talk about leader development today, Attila would surely say that lead-
ers must encourage creativity, freedom of action and innovation among their subordinates, 
as long as these efforts are consistent with the goals of the tribe or nation. 
THE MASTER OF DESTRUCTION
The recent book of General Stanley McChrystal12, who has been the JSOTF Commander in 
Iraq, and several recent articles published in open sources and magazines, shed some light 
on the organization and leadership used to track down and eliminate a highly elusive and 
networked enemy in Iraq . 
In order to make the JSOTF more effective, McChrystal partnered with agencies to 
fuse intelligence, and synchronize operations . Together they redesigned the bureaucratic 
ways information travelled up in a pipeline, and developed a real-time information sharing 
environment . It was not enough though, so in the next phase of organizational transforma-
tion they combined all elements of intelligence (finding the enemy); drone operators and 
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) specialists (who fixed the target); various teams of Special 
Forces operators (for finishing); as well as analysts and experts in exploitation and crime 
scene investigation (who pulled immediate information and exploited it in order to feed it 
back to the cycle for further analysis) in order to carry out the full cycle of the operations 
that was called F3EA (find, fix, finish, exploit and analyse). From a leadership point of view, 
the linear and cumbersome bureaucratic conventional methods were replaced by a shared 
informational and operational environment . As a result of this process, there was a shift in 
mind-set and organizational culture as well through the shared consciousness among the 
various organizations . 
12 McChrystal, S . A . My Share of the Task: A Memoir. Boston: Portfolio, 2013 .
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These changes meant a whole lot more than just an experiment . This was a game chang-
er in modern warfare and had a real strategic effect as well. As it was published in Foreign 
Policy13 and in Foreign Affairs14 as well, the old COIN (counter – insurgence) adage, stating 
that it is not effective to attack the insurgent fighters as they will be replaced soon enough 
was proved wrong . With the help of some technological adjustments but mainly by reorgan-
izing and changing the leadership mentality the newly organized teams were able to turn the 
F3EA cycle around three times a night! This meant that while in 2004 in all of Iraq the task 
force did 18 raids; two years later, by August 2006 they carried out up to 300 raids a month . 
This meant that the network was operating at speeds that had never been seen before and 
all that was enabled through a new leadership approach which encouraged decentralizing 
decision making . 
Although the teams included more organizations, many of them being unconventional 
actors, they valued competency above all else . The overall result was not just a lot of cap-
tured and killed enemy fighters, but since the enemy network was hit in many places simul-
taneously, it had a very difficult time to regenerate. This had a decisive strategic effect15 and 
the disruption of the enemy network reached a previously unseen proportion . 
This organizational adaptation process of becoming a network for the JSOTF has not 
only technological and organizational components, but leadership ones as well, and the lead-
ership aspects seem to be the hardest to achieve . McChrystal points out in his interview16 
that “if organizations aren’t ready to move faster, their decision-making processes become 
overwhelmed by the information flow around them”. For JSOTF to be successful it was not 
enough to survive, but they needed to thrive . 
The concept of adaptation arises from scientific efforts to understand biological evo-
lution17, the necessary changes in the way military leaders think of asymmetric challenges 
require a completely different mind-set, which is the organizational equivalent of biological 
thriving18 . 
Operating with a decentralized decision making within the military is hard enough . The 
hierarchical decision-making process implies that the leader at every level of the pyramid 
is the person in charge of deciding and directing everything below him . By proxy the high-
est-ranking individual is the one, who always has the best answers, the deepest understand-
ing and the best solutions . This process is very deeply entrenched in the military, but it is un-
13 McChrystal, S . A . “It takes a Network” . Foreign Policy, 21 February 2011 . http://www .foreignpolicy .com/arti-
cles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network
14 McChrystal, S . A . and Rose, G . “Generation Kill: A conversation with General Stanley McChrystal” . Foreign 
Affairs 92/2 . 2013 . 2-8 . http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill?page=show
15 Robert H . Scales wrote that “as head of the U .S . Joint Special Operations Command, McChrystal oversaw the 
development of a precision killing machine unprecedented in the history of modern warfare,” one whose “scope 
and genius” will be fully appreciated only “in later decades, once the veil of secrecy has been removed” . Scales, 
R . H . “The quality of Command: The wrong way and the right way to make better generals” . Foreign Affairs 
91/6 . 2012 . 137-143 . https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/quality-command
16 McChrystal and Rose . “Generation Kill…”
17 See Mayr, E . Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist . Cambridge, MA: Belknap/
Harvard University Press, 1988 .
18 Biological evolution conforms to laws of survival, organizations, however, generate purposes beyond survival . 
Thriving in biological terms means that the species is fruitful and by multiplying and protecting its own kind it 
succeeds in passing on its gene pool . Thriving is much more than simple survival, it eventually leads to a vastly 
expanded range of living . 
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suitable for highly complex asymmetric situations, especially when we are facing adaptive 
and critical challenges which are changing minute by minute . 
Decentralizing C2 (Command and Control) is just the first step on a long road towards 
adaptation. Synchronizing and fusing different service cultures to finally become a learning 
organization (one that is able to constantly adapt) and providing a unifying vision for all this 
effort is quite an endeavour. Using unconventional leadership during this adaptation process 
is a must . 
UNCONVENTIONAL LEADERSHIP
As we could see in the two case studies, unconventional leadership takes place in the context 
of problems and complex challenges . In fact, it makes little sense of even thinking about 
leadership, when everyone is on the same sheet of music and all we need to do is to coordi-
nate routine activities . Leaders step up, when a tough or complex problem arises and they 
need to be tackled; therefore, mostly while we are in the in the zone of learning . 
The root cause of not being able to lead in an unconventional manner is our convention-
al military training, which is based on following orders, and on a clearly defined chain of 
command . But as we could see in our case studies, people without formal authority can prac-
tice leadership on any given issue at any given time . We have all seen cases in our lives when 
people had formal authority, thus a following per se, but they did not lead . Unconventional 
leaders operate without anyone experiencing anything remotely similar to the conventional 
experience of following19 . 
Before we define unconventional leadership, we must answer the questions: who is a 
leader, and where does leadership take place? There is very much debate in academic circles 
regarding the definition of a leader, but I believe that a leader is someone people follow. This 
somewhat simplistic definition captures the essence of leadership, emphasizing the main 
component: followers . Leadership always implies a relationship between a leader and those 
who are led, and that relationship exists within a context. This context can be very different 
in many cases . Corporate bureaucracies thrive in a stable, predictable environment, where 
people are mostly in their comfort zone and these organizations are best led by conventional 
leadership. But when complex problems arise, these organizations seem to be less effective 
to cope with the situation . 
So according to our definition: Unconventional leadership moves beyond conventional 
leadership territory and is presented beyond managing technical problems crossing the line 
into boldly facing complex adaptive or critical problems, and in most cases, it means going 
beyond your authority in order to tackle the problems at hand in order to orchestrate solu-
tions to unresolved problems . Unconventional leadership results in organizational or proce-
dural changes, and most importantly, changes people’s mind-sets within the organization . 
Adaptive and critical challenges also demand constant learning from unconventional 
leaders . This learning process however, is reaching a lot farther than just collecting infor-
mation . Those lessons that we gathered in the past are to be applied so that it could be stated 
that we have learned from them. This makes a critical difference in organizations between 
lessons identified and lessons learned. In the comfort zone model, we can only close the gap 
19 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring leadership in the work of adaptive progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 74 .
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between our aspirations and the reality if we learn in new ways and are able to constantly 
adapt . This in turn requires a new approach in leadership education as well . 
Another interesting factor is the people-centric approach of unconventional leaders . 
Leadership is not the same as authority . Exceeding authority is not, by itself, leadership . 
A compelling vision is not enough either . Unconventional leaders need to get followers, 
collaborators who support their vision and buy into it . What is interesting, unconventional 
leaders can also mobilize those, who are opposed to their ideas or just fence sitting . This is 
an essential skill in facing complex challenges . 
Adaptive and critical challenges often require a shift in responsibility from the shoul-
ders of the authority figures and the authority structure to the stakeholders themselves20 . In 
contrast with the technical challenges, where experts can solve our problems, in the zone of 
challenge, facing critical challenges, a different kind of responsibility-taking and leadership 
mentality are required . This is where unconventional leadership can thrive . If we are look-
ing for authority figures in these kinds of situations, it means that we are treating critical 
challenges just as if they were technical ones, and approaching them with a conventional 
leadership mind-set and in most cases this can be really damaging . 
Finally, we have to mention the time factor, as it is most likely one of the most 
critical parts of the military decision-making process . Adaptive challenges require sig-
nificantly more time for people to develop innovative solutions and learn, than technical 
challenges . Moreover, critical challenges are even worse from the perspective of time, 
as they do not have a cookie-cutter ready to apply solutions, but generally we do not 
have time to take, as it would be the case in the case of an adaptive challenge . Overall, 
organizations need time to make cultural changes in order to adapt, but in the contem-
porary, 21st century VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) context we do not 
have that luxury any more .
FINAL THOUGHTS
As Heifetz suggests in his article21, “our language fails us in many aspects of our lives” . 
This is why we have chosen the Maori word tuatara for the title of our article . Tuatara are 
reptiles that are endemic to New Zealand . They are often referred to as living dinosaurs, as 
have largely not changed physically over very long periods of evolution going back millions 
of years . Tuatara is the only survivor of an ancient group of reptiles that lived at the same 
time as dinosaurs . The last relatives of tuatara died out about 60 million years ago which is 
why tuatara is called a ‘living fossil’ . 
But tuatara at the same time have broken records for DNA evolution as well . A dis-
covery that has astonished New Zealand scientists proves that “the tuatara has the highest 
molecular evolutionary rate that anyone has measured”22 . The new research also support-
20 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 76 .
21 Heifetz, R . A . “Anchoring Leadership in the Work of Adaptive Progress” . In Hesselbein, F . and Goldsmith, M . 
(eds .), Leader of the Future 2: Visions Strategies, and Practices for the New Era . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2006 . 73 .
22 Hay, J . M . et al . “Rapid Molecular Evolution in a Living Fossil” . Trends in Genetics 24/3 . 2008 . 106-109 .;
 DOI: 10 .0 .3 .248/j .tig .2007 .12 .002
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ed a hypothesis by the evolutionary biologist Allan Wilson, that the rate of molecular 
evolution was uncoupled from the rate of morphological evolution . This basically means 
that the tuatara is capable of remarkable rates of adaptation, yet it has hardly changed for 
ages . 
Tuatara in the local Maori language also indicates tapu (the borders of what is sacred 
and restricted) beyond which there is mana (meaning there could be serious consequences if 
that boundary is crossed) . In our example when a leader decides to walk the line and venture 
out from the comfort zone (of traditional autocratic command and control leadership) to 
tackle complex challenges, he is surely setting himself up for a lot of pushing back from oth-
ers as he disturbs the organizational equilibrium . Anyone, who has done it before, is aware 
of the personal and professional vulnerabilities of this endeavour . But with the great danger, 
there are great opportunities presented as well .
Leadership in the contemporary security context is very different to what we have been 
trained to as military personnel in the last century . Most of the time our training included 
known scenarios, and as we trained for certainty, we learned the science of war . But in the 
context of new complex challenges we also need to educate our leaders for uncertainty and 
teach them the art of war . The brave option is to embrace uncertainty, as it has a reason; it 
pushes us to reach out and by learning and adapting, develops our leaders personally, as well 
as creates remarkable organizations, not just good ones . 
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